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Tax Treaties, the Constitution,
and the Noncompulsory
Payment Rule
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

U

.S. tax treaties have been regarded as self-executing since the first treaty
(with France) was ratified in 1932.1 Rebecca Kysar has argued this raises a
doubt on whether the treaties are constitutional, because tax treaties (like
other treaties) are negotiated by the executive branch and ratified by the Senate
with no involvement by the House, and all tax-raising measures must originate
in the House under the Origination Clause (U.S. Const. Art I, section 7, clause
7). Her preferred solution is to make tax treaties non-self executing, i.e., to require them to be incorporated in legislation, as is the practice in many other
countries (e.g., the UK).2
Kysar’s solution would reverse the universal practice since 1932 and is therefore unlikely to be implemented. Moreover, tax treaties are generally precluded
from affecting revenue from U.S. taxpayers by the Saving Clause (Art. 1(4)).
Under the Saving Clause, “this Convention shall not affect the taxation by a
Contracting State of its residents (as determined under Article 4 (Resident))
and its citizens.” The Saving Clause is generally regarded as required by the
Origination Clause because if a U.S. tax treaty were to affect taxation of U.S.
citizens, this would violate the rule that all tax measures must originate in the
House.3
But Kysar’s argument raises another question in regard to the noncompulsory
payment rule (Reg. §1.901-2(e)(5)). The noncompulsory payment rule, which
has no statutory basis in the Code, states that:
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An amount paid is not a compulsory payment, and thus is not an amount of
tax paid, to the extent that the amount paid exceeds the amount of liability
under foreign law for tax. An amount paid does not exceed the amount of
such liability if the amount paid is determined by the taxpayer in a manner
that is consistent with a reasonable interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural provisions of foreign law (including applicable tax
treaties) in such a way as to reduce, over time, the taxpayer’s reasonably expected liability under foreign law for tax, and if the taxpayer exhausts all effective and practical remedies, including invocation of competent authority
procedures available under applicable tax treaties, to reduce, over time, the
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taxpayer’s liability for foreign tax (including liability
pursuant to a foreign tax audit adjustment). Where
foreign tax law includes options or elections whereby
a taxpayer’s tax liability may be shifted, in whole or
part, to a different year or years, the taxpayer’s use or
failure to use such options or elections does not result
in a payment in excess of the taxpayer’s liability for
foreign tax. An interpretation or application of foreign law is not reasonable if there is actual notice or
constructive notice (e.g., a published court decision)
to the taxpayer that the interpretation or application
is likely to be erroneous. In interpreting foreign tax
law, a taxpayer may generally rely on advice obtained
in good faith from competent foreign tax advisors to
whom the taxpayer has disclosed the relevant facts.
A remedy is effective and practical only if the cost
thereof (including the risk of offsetting or additional
tax liability) is reasonable in light of the amount at
issue and the likelihood of success. A settlement by
a taxpayer of two or more issues will be evaluated
on an overall basis, not on an issue-by-issue basis,
in determining whether an amount is a compulsory
amount. A taxpayer is not required to alter its form
of doing business, its business conduct, or the form
of any business transaction in order to reduce its liability under foreign law for tax.
Two of the examples given in the regulation for noncompulsory payments do not involve tax treaties (Reg.
§1.901-2(e)(5), Examples 1 and 5). Examples 2, 3 and
4 do involve a tax treaty that embodies the arm’s length
standard, but it is not clear that the existence vel non
of the treaty affects the result, because the arm’s length
standard would usually apply to related party transactions under both U.S. and foreign law in the absence of
a treaty.
Similarly, most of the case law under the noncompulsory payment rule does not involve tax treaties, or
if it does it only involves the arm’s length standard,
and the IRS has largely been unsuccessful in applying
the rule to deny foreign tax credits.4 The exception is
Procter & Gamble, in which the taxpayer paid tax on
the same royalties to both Korea and Japan, and was
held to have violated the noncompulsory payments
rule because it only tried to challenge the Korean tax
under the applicable treaty but not the Japanese tax,
so it could not get credit for the Japanese tax.5 But in
this case as well, it is not clear that the treaty by itself
changed the result.
However, the regulation also contains the following
example:
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Example 6.
The internal law of country X imposes a 25 percent
tax on the gross amount of interest from sources
in country X that is received by a nonresident of
country X. Country X law imposes the tax on the
nonresident recipient and requires any resident of
country X that pays such interest to a nonresident
to withhold and pay over to country X 25 percent
of such interest, which is applied to offset the recipient’s liability for the 25 percent tax. A tax treaty
between the United States and country X overrides
internal law of country X and provides that country
X may not tax interest received by a resident of the
United States from a resident of country X at a rate
in excess of 10 percent of the gross amount of such
interest. A resident of the United States may claim
the benefit of the treaty only by applying for a refund of the excess withheld amount (15 percent of
the gross amount of interest income) after the end of
the taxable year. A, a resident of the United States,
receives a gross amount of 100u (units of country
X currency) of interest income from a resident of
country X from sources in country X in the taxable
year 1984, from which 25u of country X tax is withheld. A does not file a timely claim for refund. 15u
of the amount withheld (25u − 10u) is not a compulsory payment and hence is not an amount of tax.
On its face, this is a justified application of the noncompulsory payment rule, because the taxpayer could under
the specified facts easily obtain a refund of the extra 15u
by filing a refund claim. It is unclear whether any actual taxpayer is ever so negligent. More commonly, the
taxpayer faces a foreign withholding agent that ignores
the treaty by applying the higher withholding amount,
and the taxpayer’s efforts to obtain a refund may be unavailing in many countries that follow the principle that a
tax withheld can never be refunded.
But the example raises an interesting question:
Suppose there was no treaty, what would the result have
been? The answer is clearly that in that case there would
be withholding of 25u with no refund and a full foreign
tax credit. So here we have a situation in which the tax
treaty by its very existence and by the terms of the relevant article raises the U.S. taxpayer’s U.S. tax liability
because it now has to pay 25u to X and another 15u to
the United States. What about the ability of the U.S.
Continued on page 59
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Debt Push Downs and
Debt-Netting Rule
Continued from page 10
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obtained a Code Sec. 904 benefit from locating
an equal amount of interest-bearing debt at
the CFC and U.S. Parent level commensurate
with the relative assets.
Reg. §1.861-10(e). One condition of the
debt-netting rule’s application is that the U.S.
shareholder increase both its external debt
at the U.S. shareholder level and its loans receivable from related CFCs during the base period. In the Example above, U.S. shareholder’s
receivables from CFCs increase by $500, but the
debt-netting rule would not apply if U.S. shareholder indebtedness were constant relative to
the base period. See Reg. §1.861-10(e)(1)(ii).
The debt-netting rules specially allocate interest expense to foreign source income to the
extent of income on so-called “allocable RGI.”
Allocable RGI is equal to an amount of RGI equal
to the lesser of its excess RGI and excess USSI.
See Reg. §1.861-10(e)(4)(ii). Where only some of
the taxpayer’s RGI is allocable RGI, only a ratable portion of the interest income on such RGI
gives rise to a special allocation of interest expense. For simplicity, the examples in the text
above assume that all of the CFC-level RGI is allocable RGI, so that interest expense equal to all
interest income on the U.S. shareholder’s loan
to the CFC is subject to the special allocation.
See Reg. §1.904-5(c)(2).
The loan receivable would be in the passive
basket to the extent related-person interest
expense is allocated against passive basket
income under Reg. §1.904-5(c).
See Reg. §1.861-8(d)(2)(ii)(A).
In addition, under Code Sec. 951A(b)(2), if the
Parent has a positive QBAI position in its CFCs,
this interest expense would reduce 10% of
QBAI return that is exempt from tax.
Reg. §1.861-10(e)(4)(v).
See Code Sec. 954(c)(6); Notice 2007-9.
From the perspective of the debt-netting regulation, this hybrid scenario does not give rise
to allocable RGI or a direct allocation of interest expense against foreign source income.
A special rule in Reg. §1.861-10(e) treats the additional $500 of equity investment in CFC1 as
an increase in RGI. However, the income on the
CFC stock (here, the GILTI inclusion attributable to CFC1) is not treated as income from RGI
subject to a special allocation. See Reg. §1.86110(e)(8)(v). Additionally, to prevent the application of this rule from distorting the normal
allocation fraction under Code Sec. 861, proposed regulations issued in November 2020
(REG-101657-20) would repeal this special rule
effective for taxable years ending on or after
November 2, 2020. See Proposed Reg. §1.86110(h). See also Reg. §1.861-10(e)(8)(vi) (making
a similar change for the rules for hybrid debt
effective in December 2018).
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Noncompulsory Payment
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taxpayer to choose not to invoke the
treaty if this leads to a more favorable tax result?6
In my opinion, such a result is
unconstitutional because the tax
treaty raises the U.S. taxpayer’s U.S.
tax, in violation of the Origination
Clause.7
More broadly, one may question
the policy rationale behind the noncompulsory payment rule, which as
far as I know is unique among countries that allow foreign tax credits,
just as the fact that U.S. tax treaties
are self-executing puts the United
States in a small minority of countries
that do not require any legislation for
a tax treaty to come into effect.8 The
noncompulsory payments rule is full
of limitations that are difficult for taxpayers to navigate: When is “the cost
thereof (including the risk of offsetting or additional tax liability) … reasonable in light of the amount at issue
and the likelihood of success?” The
answer to that may be difficult for a
taxpayer to ascertain. And how does a
taxpayer distinguish transactions that
fall under the rule from transactions
that “alter its form of doing business,
its business conduct, or the form of
any business transaction?” Moreover,
the IRS has lost most of the cases it
litigated under the rule.
Perhaps it is time to eliminate the
noncompulsory payment rule as too
complex and not worth the effort it
requires from both taxpayers and the
IRS, as well as sometimes unconstitutional. In addition, the rule could
be challenged if the Supreme Court
does away with Chevron deference
because it has no basis in the statutory
text. If that outcome is considered
too generous to taxpayers who would
be tempted to be negligent at the

expense of the fisc, the solution may
be to place limits on full creditability,
as Dan Shaviro has long advocated
and as Congress has done for GILTI.9
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